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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the importance of labor
market conditions and in particular of employment protection legislation as a de-
terminant of bilateral Foreign Direct Investment ﬂows to seven Central and Eastern
European countries. Although our results indicate that countries characterized by
low unit labor costs tend to attract more Foreign Direct Investment, we ﬁnd no
evidence suggesting that employment protection legislation matters in this context.
This result also holds if we control for the riskiness of the host countries.
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11 Introduction
Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have increasingly become a destination
for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) over the last decades. For several reasons, FDI
ﬂows are generally regarded as an important source of growth for these economies. FDI
increases the capital stock and thereby has a rather direct impact on the productive
capacity in the host country. In addition, FDI may foster technological innovation by
facilitating the diﬀusion of new technologies to the host countries. This aspects appears
to be particularly relevant, since the literature on economic growth emphasizes the role
of technological progress.1 Consequently, FDI ﬂows in CEEC may substantially shorten
the transition period.
Hence, it is not surprising that the eﬀects and the determinants of FDI in CEEC have
been analyzed extensively. Although the literature has not yet reached a consensus con-
cerning the most important determinants of FDI, gravity variables such as proximity and
host market and home country size are typically found to be relevant (Bevan and Estrin,
2004; Demekas et al., 2007). In addition, several studies document that labor market con-
ditions matter for FDI, where labor market conditions are typically summarized by unit
labor costs. Most of these studies ﬁnd that countries characterized by relatively low unit
labor costs tend to have higher FDI inﬂows (see e.g. Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Carstensen
and Toubal, 2004; Bellak et al., 2007). Thus, it appears that countries compete with low
production costs to attract FDI. Although unit labor costs are certainly an important
indicator for production costs and labor market conditions, institutional factors inﬂuenc-
ing the rigidity of labor markets in the host country may also determine FDI decisions
of multinational companies (MNCs). Rigid labor markets impose costs of adjusting the
production level. An MNC which invests in a country characterized by a large degree of
labor market rigidity commits itself in a sense to maintaining its workforce rather stable.
Haaland et al. (2002) formalize this point and argue that these considerations are espe-
cially relevant for companies operating in risky environments. Since riskiness increases
the likelihood of a considerable reduction of the production level, ﬁrms may take poten-
1Liu (2002) ﬁnds that FDI generates large spillover eﬀects on the level and growth of productivity in
China.
2tial adjustment or exit costs into account to a greater extent when making investment
decisions. Consequently, rigid labor markets may deter FDI especially in countries which
are classiﬁed as risky.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically if labor market conditions and
in particular employment protection legislation play a quantitatively important role for
FDI ﬂows to seven CEECs. Our contribution to the literature is three-fold: First, we
have a particular focus on CEE host countries of FDI. So far only few studies deal with
the impact of rigid labor markets on FDI in general and in CEECs in particular. Second,
we include unit labor costs along with an indicator for labor market ﬂexibility in our
empirical model, which is not standard in the literature. And third, we use data on
employment protection legislation based on the OECD-methodology (see OECD, 2004)
as proxies for the rigidity of labor markets. Despite of some shortcomings the OECD
indicator is the best indicator which is available for the purpose of making international
comparisons (Ochel, 2005). To our knowledge these data have not been used so far to
study the impact of labor market institutions on FDI in CEE host countries.
The analysis is based on a macro panel data set which comprises seven FDI home
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the
US) and seven host countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Slovenia and Slovakia). This group of host countries appears to be the main target for FDI
within the CEEC.2 The time span ranges from 1995 until 2003 as data on employment
protection legislation is available for this time span only.
We ﬁnd that FDI ﬂows are signiﬁcantly higher in countries with relatively low unit
labor costs. Thus, we conﬁrm the conventional wisdom in this respect. We also ﬁnd that
employment protection legislation does not exert a statistically signiﬁcant impact on FDI
ﬂows. This result also holds if we control for the riskiness of the host countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section gives a brief
survey on the existing literature of labor market ﬂexibility as a determinant of FDI. Section
three describes the empirical model our analysis is based upon and brieﬂy discusses the
2In 2003, the host countries in our sample accounted for 61 percent of the total inward FDI stock in
the 17 CEECs. The seven home countries in our sample accounted for 73 percent of the inward FDI
stock in the CEECs in our sample in 2003.
3data used. Section four presents the results and section ﬁve concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) study the importance of labor market characteristics
using ﬁrm level data covering the period 1998 to 2001. Their sample includes Western
and Eastern European host countries of FDI, with the latter including Bulgaria, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Ukraine. As proxies for labor market ﬂexibility
they data from the Global Competitiveness Report published by the World Economic
Forum and the Center for International Development at Harvard University as well as
data compiled by Djankov et al. (2001) are used. Javorcik and Spatareanu (2005) ﬁnd
that greater labor market ﬂexibility fosters FDI. Yet, they also report that for the CEECs
the impact of rigid labor markets drops substantially.
G¨ org (2005) studies to what extent labor market regulations matter for the location
of US outward FDI stocks in manufacturing in 33 host countries over the period 1986
to 1996. G¨ org (2005) also uses data from the Global Competitiveness Report to proxy
labor market ﬂexibility. He concludes that labor market regulation has an impact on the
location decision. However, no CEEC is included in the sample.
Benassy-Quere et al. (2007a) analyze the impact of various institutional variables on
the bilateral FDI stocks of a broad range of countries, mainly developing countries.3
They also include three measures for the degree of labor market regulation in force taken
from the Fraser Institute database and the Institutional Proﬁle database developed by
the foreign network of the French Ministry of Finance. For two of these three variables
Benassy-Quere et al. (2007a) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative impact on FDI. The coeﬃcient of
the third variable, capturing the regulation of labor markets and taken from the Fraser
Institute database, enters with the wrong sign, yet also statistically insigniﬁcant in the
gravity model used.
A common feature of these three studies is that they do not include unit labor costs
as an explanatory variable in their empirical model. Thus, an important determinant of
FDI, potentially related to the degree of labor market ﬂexibility, is omitted. Javorcik and
3A list of countries included in the estimation is not provided by Benassy-Quere et al. (2007a).
4Spatareanu (2005) include a proxy for labor costs, which however does not capture labor
productivity. Omitting labor productivity from the labor costs variable implicitly implies
the assumption that the investor is able to transfer labor productivity from the home
country to the host countries of FDI. Yet, when investigating FDI location decisions in the
CEECs this assumption is probably not justiﬁed as these countries suﬀer inter alia from
low quality ﬁrm speciﬁc infrastructure which results in a relatively low labor productivity
(see e.g Bellak et al., 2007). Thus, for the CEECs it appears to be particularly relevant
to control for labor productivity when measuring labor costs.
In contrast, Haaland et al. (2002) and Benassy-Quere et al. (2007b) include unit labor
costs along with a proxy for labor market ﬂexibility. Haaland et al. (2002) use data on
537 subsidiaries of Western MNCs located in the manufacturing sector in three CEECs,
Bulgaria, Poland and Romania, that covers the period 1994 to 1997. They ﬁnd that labor
market ﬂexibility, measured by the excess job reallocation rate, has a signiﬁcant negative
impact on the location decisions of MNCs.
Finally, Benassy-Quere et al. (2007b) using sector-level data on US outward FDI stocks
for the period 1994 to 2002 in 15 Western and three Eastern European countries (the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland) and using data from the Fraser Institute as proxies for
labor market ﬂexibility generally ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant negative impact of labor
market ﬂexibility on FDI. Their proxy for labor market ﬂexibility enters signiﬁcantly only
in a few cases and in these cases it carries the wrong sign.
Summing up, the existing literature on FDI and labor market ﬂexibility is scarce and
shows an ambiguous picture as not all studies ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative impact of labor
market ﬂexibility on FDI. Moreover, none of the existing studies has a particular focus
on FDI to a broad set of CEE host countries.
3 Empirical Speciﬁcation and Data
Our analysis is based on the gravity model to explain bilateral FDI outﬂows from the
seven home countries of FDI to the seven CEE host countries mentioned above from 1995
to 2003. Although the gravity model is primarily the workhorse model for the analysis
of international trade ﬂows, it has also been successfully applied to explain bilateral FDI
5ﬂows (see Bevan and Estrin, 2004, among others). Hence, we include the standard gravity
variables, that is the GDPs of the home country, GDPit, and the host country, GDPjt,
capturing host market and home country size, and the distance, distij, between home and
host country, capturing inter alia transport costs, cultural similarities and historical ties,
in our equation.
We augment the standard gravity model by a set of control variables, unit labor costs
and indicators for employment protection legislation of various forms. Speciﬁcally, we
model FDI outﬂows from home country i to host country j as
FDIijt = α + β
0Xijt−1 + γ
0Yijt−1 + δ
0Zjt + λt + αij + uijt, (1)
where Xijt = (logGDPit,logGDPjt,logdistij) is a vector containing the standard gravity
variables in logged form. Yijt is a vector of control variables motivated by the literature
(see e.g. Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Carstensen and Toubal, 2004; Demekas et al., 2007).
Depending on the exact speciﬁcation estimated, Yijt will include the bilateral eﬀective
average tax rate of a host country, beatrijt, a proxy for the privatization process in the
host country in logged form, privjt, a proxy for political risk, riskjt, in the host country
and the increase in producer prices, infljt, as a proxy for the macroeconomic stability.
Moreover we consider tariﬀ revenues as percent of imports, tarjt, which we inter-
pret as a proxy for trade costs, and a common border dummy, combordij, as potential
determinants of FDI. Our primary interest is on the eﬀects of the labor market related
variables contained in Zjt. Again, depending on the speciﬁcation we estimate, Zjt includes
a proxy for unit labor costs, ulcjt and for employment protection legislation. Concerning
the latter we distinguish four variables: epljt which represents the summary indicator of
the strictness of employment protection legislation and three indicators which capture
more narrowly deﬁned aspects of employment protection, namely, protection against col-
lective dismissals, colldisjt, regulation concerning temporary contracts, tempjt, and the
regulation of regular contracts, regjt.
To test the hypothesis that labor market rigidities impose adjustment costs which
become especially relevant in uncertain or risky environments as argued in Haaland et al.
(2002), we also estimate a speciﬁcation where riskjt (lagged) is interacted with epljt,
(epl ∗ risk)jt. Since labor market rigidities may hamper FDI ﬂows especially in the case
6of high unit labor costs, we also estimate a speciﬁcation where ulcjt (lagged) is interacted
with epljt, represented by (epl∗ulc)jt. Finally, λt are time dummies, and αij are country-
pair speciﬁc eﬀects.
Note that following Bevan and Estrin (2004) and Egger and Winner (2005) we take
the log of all variables denominated in euro and use lagged values of all variables except
for the proxies for employment protection legislation to guard against the possibility of
reverse causality and to take into account that FDI ﬂows to the CEECs may rely on
lagged rather than on contemporaneous information. We use contemporaneous values of
the employment protection legislation indicators as these variables vary only slightly over
time. Therefore contemporaneous correlations appear to be of minor importance.4
The expected signs of the coeﬃcients on the GDPs, on the common border dummy, on
the privatization process and due to measurement reasons also on political risk are positive
(cf. Table 1). The bilateral eﬀective average tax rate, unit labor costs, inﬂation and the
various proxies for employment protection legislation are expected to enter negatively.
While a larger distance between countries may encourage FDI due to high transport costs
it may also discourage FDI due to diﬀerences in culture and institutions. Thus, a priori
the sign on the distance coeﬃcient is ambiguous. However, we expect a negative sign
for several reasons (see also Bellak et al., 2007). First, intra-ﬁrm trade ﬂows between
parent and aﬃliate tend to be high in the case of eﬃciency seeking FDI and the costs of
re-exporting are an important determinant of overall cost.5 Second, a large distance will
impact negatively even on market-seeking FDI if aﬃliates are relatively new, since they
typically depend on headquarter services and intermediate inputs supplied by the parent.
Thirdly, the negative impact of distance on FDI has been shown by the vast majority of
empirical studies.
The impact of high tariﬀs on the volume of FDI received by a country depends on the
underlying motive for FDI, eﬃciency or market seeking FDI. In the former case FDI may
be deterred by high tariﬀs and in the latter case high tariﬀs my spur FDI (‘tariﬀ-jumping
FDI’). Thus, the sign of this variable is ambiguous a priori. For reasons similar to those
4Similar results, which are available upon request, are obtained with one-period lagged values of the
employment protection variables.
5For a classiﬁcation and discussion of diﬀerent types of FDI ﬂows, see (Barba Navaretti and Venables,
2004, p. 30f).
7outlined above for distance we also expect tariﬀs to enter negatively.
To estimate equation (1) we use data obtained from various sources. Details on data
sources are provided in Table 1. The FDI data are denominated in millions of current
euros and are mainly taken from Eurostat’s ‘New Cronos’ database, the ‘OECD Interna-
tional Direct Investment Statistics Yearbook’ and the ‘OECD Foreign Direct Investment’
database. Missing values are substituted by information from National Banks (in particu-
lar the De Nederlandsche Bank and the Croatian National Bank) and National Statistical
Oﬃces (in particular the Oﬃce of National Statistics in the UK and the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis).
As an indicator for labor market rigidity we use data on employment protection leg-
islation for which our principal data sources are OECD (2004) and OECD (1999). For
Slovenia, Bulgaria and Croatia the data are obtained from various sources (cf. Table
1). However, in any case the indicators were constructed based on the methodology out-
lined in OECD (1999) and are therefore comparable to the data provided directly by the
OECD. Each of the subindicators mentioned above (colldisjt, tempjt and regjt) is based
on a weighted average of diﬀerent variables, as for instance the deﬁnition of collective dis-
missals, the maximum number of successive contracts allowed, the duration of severance
payments or notiﬁcation procedures. In total 18 variables are included in the summary
indicator, epljt, which itself is a weighted average of the subindicators. These 18 variables
are based on several national sources, multi-country surveys and information provided by
national governments (see Ochel, 2005, for details). Each indicator ranges between zero
(lowest possible employment protection) and six.
(Table 1 about here: Deﬁnition and Sources of Variables )
In 2003 the US, Canada, the UK, Ireland and New Zealand show the lowest values for
epljt ranging from 0.7 to 1.3 (OECD, 2004). Table 2 shows the values for the CEECs in
2003. Bulgaria turns out to the country with the highest level of employment protection
among the CEECs included in our sample. Also Croatia and Slovenia show values which
are similar to what we observe in Germany (2.5) and France (2.9) for instance. Overall,
the four CEE-OECD member states are among the least restrictive EU-countries. It has
8to be noted, that many CEECs reformed their employment protection legislation in 2003,
with Croatia, Slovakia and Slovenia relaxing their provisions substantially (OECD, 2004;
Ignjatovic, 2006; Bejakovic, 2006) and Poland and Bulgaria tightening their provisions
somewhat (OECD, 2004; Micevska, 2004). Also note, that besides showing substantial
heterogeneity across the CEECs, Table 2 also reveals heterogeneity across the employment
protection indicators for a given country. Notably, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have
relative strict protection of regular wage contracts whereas temporary contracts are only
weakly regulated. For Poland we observe strong protection against collective dismissals
with a relatively low value of the summary indicator.
(Table 2 about here: Employment Protection Legislation in 2003)
Tables 3 and 4 show the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics of the vari-
ables used. Two issues arise: First, the explanatory variables may be subject to multi-
collinearity. Although the correlation coeﬃcients seem to be suﬃciently low in most cases,
there are some exceptions, e.g. the correlation between riskjt and tarjt. Therefore we
take this potential multi-collinearity into account in our estimation by stepwise dropping
multi-collinear variables and analyzing the impact on sign and signiﬁcance of other vari-
ables. And second, Table 4 shows that the between country-pair variability is much higher
than the within country-pair variability. Thus, an estimator which does not drop all of
the former variability (e.g. the random eﬀects or the Hausman-Taylor estimator) might
be especially suitable for the dataset at hand.
(Table 3 about here: Correlation matrix)
(Table 4 about here: Descriptive statistics)
94 Estimation Results
A general-to-speciﬁc estimation strategy leads to the elimination of several control vari-
ables.6 In particular, tariﬀs, political and macroeconomic risk and the common border
dummy are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Concerning tariﬀs this result is as ex-
pected since tariﬀs have been very low throughout the period considered. The same applies
to political and macroeconomic risk. The insigniﬁcance of the common border variable is
due to the inclusion of the head-to-head distance, logdistij, as additional regressor.
The second column of Table 6 displays the estimation results for our baseline spec-
iﬁcation. We estimate equation (1) as a random eﬀects model which is supported by
the Hausman-test. The gravity variables enter with the expected sign and turn out to
be signiﬁcant at least at the 10 percent level.7 Moreover, point estimates are similar in
magnitude to those reported in the literature. The tax rate has a negative impact on FDI
ﬂows, whereas the privatization process tends to increase FDI.
Turning to the labor market related variables,unit labor costs are negatively and highly
signiﬁcantly related to FDI ﬂows. As expected, labor costs are clearly an important
determinant of FDI ﬂows into transition economies. In contrast, the summary indicator
for employment protection legislation is negatively signed as expected but turns out to
be statistically insigniﬁcant.
Columns three to ﬁve of Table 6 show the results for the various subindicators of em-
ployment protection legislation. Our results are robust with respect to diﬀerent indicators.
The impact of employment protection legislation on FDI is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero regardless of the proxy for employment protection in question. Note, that for regjt
the Hausman-test rejects the null hypothesis of random eﬀects and we therefore present
results from the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation in this case. Again, we ﬁnd an insigniﬁcant impact
of labor market ﬂexibility on FDI.
As an additional robustness check we re-estimate the baseline speciﬁcation using the
Hausman-Taylor estimator. As argued in Egger (2004), logdistij, might be correlated
6To preserve space we do not report details for this preliminary analysis. Full estimation results are
available upon request.
7All estimated standard errors are robust to the presence of arbitrary heteroscedasticity. Serial corre-
lation is not any issue as shown by the AR(1) values in the Tables.
10with the αij. In addition, the eﬀective average tax rate, beatrijt, which varies along the
country-pair dimension, is prone to be correlated with αij. Hence, we consider logdistij
and beatrijt as correlated with the country-pair eﬀects in the Hausman-Taylor estimation.
The last column of Table 6 shows the results. We see that our results are also robust with
respect to the estimator used. As expected (see Egger, 2004) the coeﬃcient on logdistij
increases in absolute value and the coeﬃcient on beatrijt drops towards the ﬁxed eﬀects
estimate.8
(Table 6 about here: FDI and Employment Protection Legislation)
Table 7 contains several further robustness checks. The eﬀect of omitting unit labor
costs, which is common in the existing literature, is shown in the second column. Indeed,
when ulcjt is dropped, epljt enters negatively as before, becomes statistically signiﬁcant
and the estimated coeﬃcient increases substantially in magnitude. Moreover, the coeﬃ-
cients on the remaining variables remain unchanged compared to the second column of
Table 6. Thus, it appears that the explanatory power of ulcjt is captured by epljt to some
extent, which is not implausible as these two variables probably carry joint information
about labor market conditions. Speciﬁcally, institutional aspects like strict employment
protection legislation might inﬂuence wage negotiations and therefore any eﬀects exerted
by labor market institutions are already contained in bargained wages. Consequently,
diﬀerences in employment protection legislation across the countries in our sample also
manifest themselves in diﬀerences in unit labor costs.
To check whether the impact of employment protection legislation is already be con-
tained in ulcjt, we proceed by eliminating common eﬀects of ulcjt and epljt from the
former variable. We follow Benassy-Quere et al. (2007a) and proceed in two steps: First,
we regress ulcjt on epljt using the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, and second, we include the
estimated residual of this regression, ulcgenuinejt, instead of ulcjt in our baseline speciﬁ-
cation. If epljt inﬂuences FDI inﬂows indirectly via ulcjt, one would expect epljt to enter
signiﬁcantly in this modiﬁed speciﬁcation.
Results are shown in column three of Table 7. Although the signiﬁcance of epljt
8Using the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator, the point estimate of the coeﬃcient on beatrijt is about -0.04 and
is highly statistically signiﬁcant.
11increases somewhat, the negative impact remains statistically insigniﬁcant. Again, the
coeﬃcients of the remaining variables hardly change. The coeﬃcient of ulcgenuinejt is
larger in absolute value than the various estimates shown for ulcjt derived from the random
eﬀects estimator. Actually the coeﬃcient of ulcgenuinejt is closer to the coeﬃcient of ulcjt
derived from the ineﬃcient ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (not shown). This is not unexpected
as we have purged ﬁxed eﬀects from ulcjt in the ﬁrst stage regression. Summing up,
this exercise stresses the fact that employment protection legislation does neither exert a
direct eﬀect nor an indirect eﬀect, via ulcjt, on FDI in the CEECs included.9
To explore the possibility that employment protection legislation matters only in coun-
tries with relatively high unit labor costs we interact epljt with (lagged) ulcjt. Results are
shown column four of Table 7. The coeﬃcients of epljt and on the interaction term are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.10 Hence, our result do not suggest that country risk
matters in this context.
Finally we analyze the possibility that labor market rigidities are more relevant in
relatively risky countries along the lines of Haaland et al. (2002). We add the political
risk level (lagged) of the host country, riskjt, as an explanatory variable and also interact
it with epljt, (epl ∗ risk)jt. From the ﬁfth column of Table 7 we see that epljt is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in this augmented speciﬁcation. Moreover, the marginal
eﬀect of epljt turns out to be insigniﬁcant for any level of riskjt considered. Hence, we
conﬁrm our previous result that epljt has no direct eﬀect on FDI ﬂows. In addition, we
may now conclude that this results holds regardless of the riskiness of the host country.
This result is in line with G¨ org (2005) who does not ﬁnd any amplifying eﬀect of the level
of riskiness of a host country.
As diﬀerent country risk indicators usually measure diﬀerent aspects we provide an-
other robustness check and use the risk indicator of the Political Risk Service Group
(PRSG), icrgjt, taken from Euromoney instead of riskjt. This alternative indicator cap-
tures some socio-economic risk aspects not covered by riskjt. From the last column of 7
9As ulcgenuine is a generated regressor bootstrapped standard errors are reported in column three.
Speciﬁcally, we use a non-parametric bootstrap with 1000 replications (see Wooldridge, 2002, p. 378f).
10Note that it is generally possible to obtain a signiﬁcant impact of the interacted variable even if the
coeﬃcients on the variable itself and on the interaction term are insigniﬁcant (see Brambor et al., 2006).
In our case, evaluating the marginal eﬀect of epljt on FDI for diﬀerent values of ulcjt shows that the
marginal eﬀect is insigniﬁcant for any value of ulcjt contained in our sample.
12we see that using the PRSG-indicator does not change our results.
5 Summary
In this paper we study the inﬂuence of labor market conditions on FDI ﬂows into a sample
of CEECs. In particular we analyze the inﬂuence of employment protection legislation
as a proxy for the rigidity of labor markets in a broader sense. While we ﬁnd that FDI
ﬂows are signiﬁcantly higher in countries with relatively low unit labor costs, we do not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant eﬀects of the degree of employment protection legislation. This latter
result is valid whenever unit labor costs are included in the empirical model along with the
proxy for employment protection legislation used. The result also is robust with respect
to the level of the riskiness of host countries of FDI. Overall, we conclude that rigid labor
markets are of limited importance as location factor once unit labor costs are considered.
It appears conceivable that employment protection legislation has some indirect inﬂu-
ence upon FDI ﬂows via the wage bargaining process and thus via unit labor costs. Such
indirect eﬀects seem plausible, since institutional aspects of the labor market may already
be reﬂected in bargained wages. Although, our results indicate that these indirect eﬀects
should be negligible a more detailed analysis of this issue appears to be an interesting
direction for future research.
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16Table 2: Employment Protection Legislation in 2003
Czech Republic Poland Hungary Slovenia Slovakia Bulgaria Croatia
epl 1.90 2.10 1.70 2.52 2.00 2.70 2.60
colldis 2.10 4.10 2.90 3.30 2.50 2.60 4.30
temp 0.50 1.30 1.10 2.30 0.40 3.40 1.90
reg 3.30 2.20 1.90 2.70 3.50 2.20 2.60





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































18Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev Min Max
logFDI overall 4.17 1.86 -1.20 8.44
between 1.54 1.30 7.26
within 1.12 0.53 7.76
logGDPi overall 13.88 1.12 12.12 16.24
between 1.13 12.20 16.05
within 0.15 13.47 14.24
logGDPj overall 10.37 0.85 8.96 12.27
between 0.83 9.31 11.96
within 0.19 9.90 10.85
logdist overall 6.94 1.00 4.04 8.98
between 1.01 4.04 8.98
within 0.00 6.94 6.94
combord overall 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00
between 0.35 0.00 1.00
within 0.00 0.15 0.15
beatr overall 33.44 8.43 5.19 56.20
between 7.53 9.89 50.63
within 4.35 16.22 45.75
ulc overall 26.98 9.54 11.27 51.90
between 9.48 15.59 48.07
within 1.97 21.70 32.93
logpriv overall -0.52 1.37 -2.86 2.13
between 1.11 -2.42 1.08
within 0.83 -3.97 1.53
epl overall 2.50 0.73 1.50 3.60
between 0.71 1.50 3.60
within 0.19 1.62 2.68
reg overall 2.72 0.65 1.90 3.60
between 0.65 1.90 3.60
within 0.09 2.11 2.92
19Table 5: Descriptive Statistics (continued)
temp overall 1.85 1.35 0.40 3.90
between 1.32 0.50 3.90
within 0.28 0.10 2.29
colldis overall 3.51 1.02 2.10 5.00
between 1.00 2.10 5.00
within 0.22 2.20 3.76
risk overall 14.12 3.29 5.32 19.17
between 2.83 9.03 17.15
within 1.68 8.59 18.03
tar overall 4.74 4.11 0.50 18.45
between 3.40 1.15 12.16
within 2.33 0.17 13.47
infl overall 26.25 125.37 -1.80 971.08
between 49.98 1.29 171.05
within 114.91 -143.39 847.51
icrg overall 78.11 4.53 65.67 86.58
between 3.99 70.50 82.15
within 2.68 72.42 84.32
Obs. = 355 (for icrg Obs. = 300) N = 49 T-average = 7.2
20Table 6: FDI and Employment Protection Legislation
Estimator RE RE FE RE H-T
logGDPi 0.33* 0.33* 0.29 0.30* 0.51’
(1.93) (1.93) (0.28) (1.77) (1.58)
logGDPj 0.98*** 1.06*** 1.80** 0.95*** 0.83***
(3.87) (5.12) (2.11) (3.89) (3.01)
logdist -0.69*** -0.69*** dropped -0.65*** -1.06**
(-3.84) (-3.84) (-3.55) (-2.47)
beatr -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.04** -0.06*** -0.04**
(-4.44) (-4.54) (-2.17) (-4.66) (-2.15)
ulc -0.03* -0.03* -0.13*** -0.03** -0.03*
(-1.77) (-1.76) (-3.14) (-2.45) (-1.91)
logpriv 0.22** 0.24** 0.26** 0.22** 0.23**









obs. 355 355 355 355 355
R2overall 0.52 0.52 0.31 0.30 0.67
R2within 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.22
R2between 0.70 0.70 0.40 0.71
AR(1) : χ2(1) 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
H : χ2(6) 7.80 10.08 12.24* 9.66
H : χ2(4) 4.25
TD : χ2(7) 13.81* 13.31* dropped 14.11** 16.10**
Notes: z-values in parenthesis; RE denotes the random eﬀects estimator and H-T refers to the Hausman-
Taylor estimator; AR(1) is the test statistic for testing for serial correlation according to (Wooldridge,
2002, p. 282f); H denotes the Hausman-test test statistic; TD denotes the test statistic for the test of
joint signiﬁcance of time dummies; standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity; ’ / * / ** / ***
indicates signiﬁcance at 15 / 10 / 5 / 1 percent level.
21Table 7: Robustness Analysis
Estimator RE RE RE RE RE
logGDPi 0.31* 0.30** 0.33** 0.31** 0.29**
( 1.80) (2.01) (1.95) ( 2.27) (2.21)
logGDPj 0.79*** 0.90*** 0.97*** 0.98*** 0.88***
(3.61) (4.50) (3.79) (4.20) (3.71)
logdist -0.66*** -0.65*** -0.70*** -0.66*** -0.69***
(-3.61) (-3.70) (-3.88) (-4.61) (-5.39)
beatr -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.05***
(-4.24) (-3.81) (-4.49) (-4.48) (-3.27)




logpriv 0.22** 0.23** 0.22** 0.21* 0.30***
( 2.25) (2.12) (2.21) ( 1.87) (2.62)
epl -0.44* -0.29 -0.08 -0.14 0.78
(-1.87) (-0.86) (-0.11) (-0.19) (0.28)








epl ∗ icrg -0.01
(-0.18)
obs. 355 355 355 355 300
R2overall 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.54
R2within 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22
R2between 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
AR(1) : χ2(1) 0.09 0.16 0.15 1.33
TD : χ2(7) 16.46** 12.29* 13.13* 17.67** 21.72***
Notes: z-values in parenthesis; RE denotes the random eﬀects estimator and H-T refers to the Hausman-
Taylor estimator; AR(1) is the test statistic for testing for serial correlation according to (Wooldridge,
2002, p. 282); H denotes the Hausman-test test statistic; TD denotes the test statistic for the test of joint
signiﬁcance of time dummies; standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity; ’ / * / ** / *** indicates
signiﬁcance at 15 / 10 / 5 / 1 percent level.
22